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Post-Walrasian Economics: 
A Marxist Critique
GIULIO PALERMO
ABSTRACT: Post-Walrasian economics is the result of a conver-
gence between heterodox schools, such as new institutionalism, 
new Keynesian economics and radical political economics. The 
debate on power develops mainly within this methodological 
framework. Liberals and radicals have confronted each other 
harshly about the nature of power in capitalism, but their common 
method leads to the same mystified conception. Marx discussed the 
class nature of competition and explained how social coercion and 
individual freedom coexist in capitalism. Post-Walrasians represent 
competition as the highest expression of individual freedom and 
characterize power as its negation. Reality is thus turned upside-
down, as in old vulgar economics: the power relation suffered by 
the worker is not caused by his/her social weakness, but by his/
her individual strength. From the questions it raises to the answers 
it offers, post-Walrasian economics is only a product of bourgeois 
ideology and a tool to reinforce its myths.
IN WINTER 1993, THE EDITORS of the Journal of Economic Per-spectives asked some authoritative economists representing main-stream and heterodox approaches to present these approaches 
and discuss the relationships among them. Exponents of the new 
Keynesian economics, the new institutional economics, and radical 
political economics have thus clarified their indebtedness to John May-
nard Keynes, old institutionalism and Karl Marx, the specificity of their 
“new” approaches and their positions towards orthodox neoclassical 
economics. The picture that emerges is that, notwithstanding some 
theoretical differences, there exists a common methodological ground 
among these approaches, which makes them largely compatible with 
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each other and with mainstream neoclassical theory. This explains the 
friendly relationships that exist today among them.
The acceptance of methodological individualism is a first impor-
tant aspect of this process of convergence. A second aspect regards 
the attempt to overcome some of the restrictive assumptions of the 
general equilibrium model, which implicitly or explicitly is the theo-
retical benchmark of all these theoretical developments. The logic 
is the following.
In the Walrasian world, characterized by complete markets, per-
fect information, full rationality and free contract enforcement, neo-
classical economics has reached the following results:
1. The state and the market are equally capable of bringing about 
an efficient allocation of resources;
2. There is no economic room for the firm or for other institutions, 
since the market alone can allocate resources efficiently;
3. There exists no power relation in market interaction.
According to new Keynesians, new institutionalists and radicals, 
the economic role of the state, the nature of capitalist institutions 
and the existence of power relations must then be explained by 
modifying the assumptions of the Walrasian world. Methodologi-
cally, these new approaches can thus be seen as part of a common 
research program, aiming at extending and generalizing the Walrasian 
framework: the latter assumes that agents interact in what might be 
called a “perfect” decision-making context; post-Walrasians deal with 
“imperfect” decision-making contexts.
In a narrower sense, however, the term “post-Walrasian econom-
ics” (PWE) is used also as a synonym for the radical approach to power 
started by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, based on “contested 
exchange.”
In this paper, I develop a Marxist critique of PWE, by focusing 
mainly on this narrow definition. The reason is that Bowles and Gintis 
come from a Marxist tradition and maintain that their theoretical 
framework is able to demonstrate rigorously, and to specify analyti-
cally, some of the arguments originally developed by Marx, such as 
the power relation between capitalists and workers. This allows me to 
discuss the logic of these demonstrations, and to ascertain whether 
their support for Marx’s conception is real or only formal. To a large 
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extent, however, my critique applies to the overall post-Walrasian 
school, broadly defined. In fact, Bowles and Gintis’ theory of power 
is strictly related to the debate on the nature of the firm — a cen-
tral theme of the new institutionalism — and to the new Keynesian 
theory of efficiency wages. I will thus extend my critique to these 
approaches every time their contributions overlap significantly with 
the debate on power. This means, of course, that my critique will not 
touch upon those parts of heterodox economics that do not follow 
the post-Walrasian methodology.
My thesis is that PWE does not offer any response to the critique 
of bourgeois economics developed by Marx. On the contrary, its theo-
retical exercises develop the same mystified conception of the “free 
trader vulgaris,” to use Marx’s expression, as its Walrasian counterpart. 
I begin by presenting PWE, its research program and the theoretical 
contribution of radical economists. I then criticize its methodology 
and the ontology that it presupposes. This allows me to discuss the 
main formal similarities between Marx and PWE and the opposite 
conceptions in which they are developed. The “scientific critique” 
ends at this point. My critical path, however, continues with discussion 
of the pre-scientific elements that lead PWE to define its scientific 
problem. In an academic conception of science, the choice of the 
scientific problem is not generally an object of criticism: researchers 
are supposed to choose freely their scientific problems and are not 
called to defend these choices. Within PWE, however, the acceptance 
of a common ideology and the definition of an identical scientific 
problem by all of its members — from ultra-liberals to radical  thinkers 
— are part of the phenomenon to be explained, and must then be 
scrutinized carefully. In the last section, I recap my arguments and 
draw some conclusions.
I. POST-WALRASIAN ECONOMICS
Power and the Post-Walrasian Research Program
Although the notions of power, coercion and domination have 
been discussed since the beginning of political economy by authors 
such as Adam Smith, Marx and Friedrich Wieser, the modern academic 
debate rarely goes back to these authors. Rather, the role of power 
in economics has come to the forefront of the academic debate in 
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the 1970s, mainly as a by-product of the debate on the nature of the 
firm, with the contrasting contributions of Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz (1972) on the one hand and Stephen Marglin (1974, 1975) 
on the other.1
The former contend that formal authority within the firm is only 
an appearance that hides a reality of perfect reciprocal freedom; the 
latter argues that power relations play a decisive role in the orga-
nization of the firm. Ronald Coase’s 1937 paper is, however, in the 
background. In this paper, Coase explicitly sets the mechanisms of 
authority and command within the firm against the market price 
mechanism as alternative modes of coordination.
Coase’s paper, let us remember, is not about the nature of capital-
ist power relations, but rather deals with “the nature of the firm” in 
capitalism. This problem may appear trivial, for the firm is an integral 
part of the capitalist system; therefore, one might argue, it is by ana-
lyzing the historical origin and development of capitalism that one 
can understand the nature of the firm and of the other institutions 
of capitalism.
The problem, however, is anything but trivial if placed within the 
context of neoclassical economics, a context in which economic insti-
tutions are seen as universal and everlasting, just as is the economic 
problem they solve: the allocation of scarce resources. Within neoclas-
sical economics, the firm and the market are just two alternative alloca-
tive mechanisms. The theoretical problem is that, in the Walrasian 
model, coordination among isolated individuals takes place entirely 
within the market, which makes all other institutions economically 
redundant: the story told to describe the general equilibrium model 
sometimes makes reference to the firm and to other institutions (such 
as the family), but analytically they are superfluous add-ons. This leaves 
the internal relations of the firm undetermined. As Paul Samuelson 
put it, “in a perfectly competitive model, it really doesn’t matter who 
hires whom; so let labor hire capital” (1957, 894).
1 I have discussed the debate on power elsewhere. In Palermo, 2000, I argue that new insti-
tutional economics fails both in its attempts to characterize theoretically the capitalist firm 
and to analyze the power relations of capitalism. In Ankarloo and Palermo, 2004, we focus 
the critique on Williamson’s transactions-cost economics. In Palermo, 2007, I develop a 
Marxist ontology of power relations in capitalism. In Palermo, 2014, I criticize the debate 
on power from a Marxist angle and I discuss the false contrast between power and perfect 
competition that characterizes this debate.
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The general equilibrium model, like any theoretical model, 
is defined by a “decision making context” (DMC) and an “organi-
zational structure.” The former defines the features of the world 
in which agents of the model live and interact; the latter defines 
the relations among them and the way in which they interact. The 
DMC of the Walrasian model is characterized by perfect informa-
tion, full rationality, and zero transaction costs. In this paper, I will 
refer to it as the “perfect” DMC. The organizational structure is a 
completely decentralized one, based on market relations among 
isolated agents.
Starting from the fact that the firm is redundant within the Walra-
sian model, Coase raises his scientific questions: Why do hierarchies 
exist in the market system? Where do the principles of authority and 
command regulating intra-firm relationships come from? These ques-
tions can be approached in many ways. Coase’s method consisted in 
exploring the reasons why coordination by explicit direction can be 
economically superior to the invisible hand of the market in a DMC 
of positive transaction costs. Methodologically, Coase thus rejects the 
perfect DMC and investigates how organizational structures with some 
degree of centralization and formal authority might perform better 
than the Walrasian one. In one way or another, thus, Coase introduces 
a form of power into the neoclassical model, and uses it to analytically 
characterize the firm as an institution qualitatively distinct from the 
market.
Against this picture, some liberal authors have denied the exis-
tence of real authority relations within the firm by explaining them as 
particular forms of competition (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Cheung, 1983). Theoretically, this approach — 
often labelled the “contractual approach” — is characterized by an 
internal tension between two conflicting objectives: on the one hand, 
it introduces imperfections in the DMC as a way to point out the 
specificity of the firm with respect to the market; on the other hand, 
however, it claims that interpersonal relations within the firm involve 
no power, an assertion that holds true only within the perfect DMC. 
Alchian and Demsetz’s provocation is famous:
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by 
fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the 
conventional market. This is delusion. . . . [The employer] can fire or sue, 
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just as I can fire my grocer by stopping purchases from him or sue him for 
delivering faulty products. (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, 777.)2
This provocation is implicitly based on a perfect DMC. However, with 
positive transaction costs, as the authors assume explicitly, even firing 
a grocer is generally costly on both sides of the relationship.
In a second line of development of Coase’s intuitions, costs and 
benefits of competition and command have been analyzed system-
atically in the attempt to determine the virtues and vices of markets 
and hierarchies. Transaction costs economics and the property rights 
theory are the main outcomes (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 
1996; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore 1988, 1990; Hart, 
1995; Moore, 1992). With respect to the contractual approach, this 
line of research provides a more articulated picture in which real world 
imperfections guide the evolution of the organizational structure of 
the firm and, more generally, of all capitalist institutions. Here there is 
no attempt to deny the existence of power relations in capitalism. On 
the contrary, the goal is to explore different DMCs in the attempt to 
find the imperfections that explain the main forms of power existing in 
capitalist organizations. But the assumption is explicit: hierarchies or 
other forms of power may exist only where the conditions for perfect 
competition do not hold.
The most explicit attempt to deal with the issue of power within 
the institutions of capitalism, however, has been developed out of 
these branches of new institutional economics, by two economists 
belonging to the radical school, namely Bowles and Gintis (Bowles, 
1985; Bowles and Gintis, 1988, 1993a, 1993b, 2000). Unlike the new 
institutionalists, they do not assume that eventual power relations 
should necessarily be sought within hierarchical organizations, such as 
the firm. They show instead that within imperfect DMCs even market 
relations generally involve power.
On a path that is largely independent of this debate on institu-
tions and power, new Keynesians have followed the same method, 
based on the introduction of imperfections into a general equilib-
rium framework. In the words of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993, 24), 
“modern Keynesians have identified these real world “imperfections” 
2 Williamson (1994, p. 325) criticizes explicitly this position, by affirming: “Firms can and do 
exercise fiat that markets cannot do,” and characterizes intra-firm relations precisely by the 
asymmetry between employers and employees.
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as the source of the problem: leaving them out of the model is like 
leaving Hamlet out of the play.” It is thus not surprising that efficiency 
wage models (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988) overlap in many ways with the models 
developed by Bowles and Gintis to analyze power relations. The com-
mon idea is that a wage higher than the market-clearing one induces 
the worker to work harder than he/she wishes. The main difference 
between them is only that, in one case, imperfections are the explana-
tory causes of allocation inefficiencies and second-best solutions; in 
the other, they are the cause of power relations.
Although these post-Walrasian approaches have sometimes con-
fronted each other with harsh polemical tones, their common neo-
classical methodology engenders the same conception of reality, a 
conception in which imperfections are the ultimate cause of the forms 
of interpersonal relations.
The Radical Contribution
Bowles and Gintis’ contested exchange framework is an attempt 
to show that power relations are not confined within the boundar-
ies of the firm, but exist in competitive markets as well. The authors 
define competition as a situation characterized by free entry and large 
numbers of buyers and sellers, but not by market clearing. With this 
definition, they demonstrate that even in competitive equilibrium 
(with non-clearing markets), a market economy sustains a system of 
power relations among agents (a competitive equilibrium is a situation 
in which actors are incapable of improving their position by altering 
variables over which they have control).3 This result is obtained by 
relaxing one of the assumptions of the Walrasian DMC that Bowles 
and Gintis consider the most implausible: the assumption that contract 
enforcement by a third party is costless and unproblematic.
Bowles and Gintis (1993a, 325) define power as “the capacity of 
some agents to influence the behavior of others to their advantage 
through the threat of imposing sanctions.” The absence of power 
3 Bowles and Gintis distinguish between “perfect competition” and “perfect Walrasian competi-
tion”: the former does not imply market clearing, the latter does (and coincides with what 
in the literature is generally called “perfect competition”). Ultimately, this is why they can 
claim that power relations exist even in a regime of perfect competition (with non-clearing 
markets). In this paper, I will continue to adopt the definition of perfect competition as 
implying market clearing.
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relations in the Walrasian model is a consequence of the condition that 
supply equals demand, which implies that each agent loses nothing by 
abandoning his optimal transaction in favor of his next best alterna-
tive: in equilibrium, the cost to agent B of foregoing an exchange with 
agent A is zero, so that A cannot affect B’s wellbeing by terminating 
the relation. Hence, Bowles and Gintis continue, A has no power over 
B. More generally, the fact that in Walrasian equilibria no agent can 
impose sanctions on other agents implies that the economy works 
without any underlying power relation among agents.
If contract enforcement is problematic, however, the picture 
changes radically. Bowles and Gintis (1993a, 332) “call an exchange 
contested, when B’s good or service possesses an attribute that is valu-
able to A, is costly for B  to provide, yet is not fully specified in an 
enforceable contract.” When exogenous contract enforcement can-
not be guaranteed at zero cost by a third party (such as the judicial 
system), the transacting parties must enforce their agreement by them-
selves. In this case, the terms of the transaction are determined by the 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms instituted by A to induce 
B to provide the desired level of the contested attribute. One such 
enforcement mechanism is contingent renewal: “contingent renewal 
obtains when A elicits performance from B by promising to renew the 
contract in future periods if satisfied, and to terminate the contract 
if not” (1993a, 333).
A typical example of contested exchange is the employer–worker 
relationship, in which “while the employer’s promise to pay the wage is 
legally enforceable, the worker’s promise to bestow an adequate level 
of effort . . . is not” (Bowles and Gintis, 1993a, 333). Other examples 
studied by Bowles and Gintis are the relationships between owner and 
manager, lender and borrower, and between parties in international 
exchanges (Gintis, 1989; Bowles, Gintis and Gustafsson, 1993; Bowles 
and Gintis, 1994). In all these cases, competitive equilibrium is char-
acterized by non-clearing markets, and agents on the short side  of the 
market have power over the agents on the long side  with whom they 
transact (where excess supply exists, the demand side is the short one, 
and vice versa). The cause of this power relation is that the agents on 
the long side who are lucky enough to enter the relation with agents 
on the short side enjoy a “rent” (defined as the difference between 
the utility they obtain thanks to the transaction and the utility they 
would have if the transaction terminates), which is costly for them 
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to lose. The fact that within imperfect DMCs perfectly competitive 
markets do not necessarily clear produces thus an asymmetry between 
the two sides of the market, which, in turn, affects interpersonal rela-
tions between single buyers and sellers.
In the case of the work relation, employers are on the short side 
of the labor market and workers enjoy a so-called “employment rent.” 
This rent is the instrument by which the employer places the worker 
under constant threat (similarly, Bowles and Gintis show that creditors 
have power over debtors and owners of enterprises have power over 
managers). It is thus the fact that unemployment is harder than work 
that confers a power of retaliation to the employer over the worker, 
and that makes the latter provide an “adequate” level of effort at work.
With respect to the voluntaristic conception of Alchian and Dem-
setz, Bowles and Gintis make a step forward. Theoretically, Alchian 
and Demsetz’s position, according to which the worker can leave the 
capitalist without utility losses, holds true only within the perfect DMC. 
Outside of it, it is generally costly to leave an interpersonal relation 
and individuals may be willing to accept some form of power, even if 
just for personal convenience.
Bowles and Gintis’ theoretical exercise, however, is not method-
ologically different from that of their liberal rivals: in their post-Walra-
sian framework, power relations exist only because of imperfections 
in the DMC. Walras could not see this, because he had eliminated all 
the imperfections of the world from his model. Alchian and Demsetz 
cannot see it either, because of their contradictory assumption that 
perfect competition is at work even within imperfect DMCs. Radi-
cal post-Walrasians, by contrast, claim to have the proper theoretical 
framework for grasping the nature of power relations in capitalism: 
imperfections are the cause of power relations. A battery of models 
formalizing all different sorts of imperfections existing in the real 
world is the way to shed light on capitalistic power relations, accord-
ing to this approach.
2. METHODOLOGY
As a development of Walrasian economics, the methodology of PWE 
incorporates the same general methodological assumptions as found 
in the Walrasian model. In order to answer its own scientific questions 
— which are derived from, but do not coincide with, those of Walras 
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— it adds, however, two new explanatory categories: imperfections and 
opportunism. These are the essential ingredients for a power relation 
to exist: opportunist behaviors within imperfect DMCs. Both these 
categories are defined ahistorically. The outcome is an ahistorical 
conception of power totally detached from the real forms of coercion 
that characterize capitalism. Let me begin my critique by considering 
these explanatory categories more carefully.
Imperfections
Bounded rationality, imperfect information, historical time, etc. 
are not historically specific to capitalism; rather, they are features of 
all human relations in any historical context. Clearly, rationality prin-
ciples and imperfections change in the history of human societies, but 
each society has its imperfections, degrees of uncertainty, asymmetric 
information, irreversible phenomena, and so forth. Therefore, accord-
ing to the logic of PWE, power relations exist in all social systems, 
since their cause — imperfections — are ubiquitous.
It is not the time to discuss whether this statement is right or 
wrong. For instance, in the Marxist tradition, all societies based on a 
certain division of labor and a degree of specialization of their mem-
bers are considered to be necessarily based on power relations. The 
methodological problem regards rather the attempt of post-Walrasians 
to explain historical processes by means of ahistorical categories.
Such a method implies that power relations have always existed, 
even before the historical development of market relations and eco-
nomic competition. However, they were invisible and could not be 
detected by scientific investigation. They became visible only with the 
historical development of capitalism and the consequent possibility of 
conceiving of a model of complete markets and perfect competition 
(and, by symmetry, models with imperfections). Post-Walrasians must 
then consider themselves to be very lucky to live in the sole epoch 
in which everlasting power relations have finally become visible, as a 
contradictory development of the Walrasian model.
The historical truth, however, is different. Market interaction 
and economic competition are not at all everlasting forms of social 
coordination. Markets played only minor roles in pre-capitalist societ-
ies and economic competition has become the main form of social 
coordination only in relatively recent times. If pre-capitalist systems, 
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with less developed or completely absent markets, were not regulated 
by economic competition, it was not because of market imperfections — 
as PWE suggests — but because of lack of markets.
Opportunism
Opportunism is the rationality principle of PWE. Methodologi-
cally, it is a generalization of Walrasian maximizing rationality in a 
DMC characterized by imperfections. The novelty is only that, in this 
new DMC in which contracts can be violated, optimal strategies might 
consist in promising one thing and doing another. 
As a methodological by-product of Walrasian categories, oppor-
tunism is introduced without explanations. The rise of opportunistic 
behaviors is assumed to be a natural fact, a consequence of human 
nature. For some reasons (which I will discuss later), post-Walrasians 
are more attracted by workers’ opportunism than by capitalists’. Even 
workers’ opportunism, however, is mainly seen as an everlasting prob-
lem stemming from the very nature of the worker, not as a historical 
product of this mode of production.
In his discussion of the working day, Marx (1867, ch. 10) points 
out that establishment of a “normal working day” was the product of 
centuries of class struggle. During this process, it was not possible to 
conceive of workers’ behavior as “cheating,” since there was as yet no 
social standard of what a normal worker should do. It is only when 
institutional disciplinary apparatuses emerged (with all the conse-
quences studied by Michel Foucault) that workers might be divided 
into “normal” and “deviant” and that those more reluctant to accept 
the discipline of the capitalist mode of production could appear as 
“cheaters,” to use mainstream economics terminology, or, following 
Foucault (1977), might even be depicted as “mad.” At the same time, 
Marx describes the growth of opportunism on the capitalists’ side: 
for instance, after the promulgation of the factory acts of the 1840s 
in Britain, which fixed the length of the working day, a great deal of 
cheating was done by employers, who simply altered the factory clock 
in order to get extra labor-time.
Although PWE conceives of opportunism as a natural starting 
point and a universal explanatory cause, it is in fact a product of com-
plex historical processes that have transformed labor into alienated 
labor and the owners of the means of production into capitalists. These 
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are the preconditions for a problem of monitoring and disciplining 
labor to emerge. And these are the reasons why a monitoring prob-
lem willy-nilly persists even in the concrete process towards another 
mode of production.4 The ahistorical methodology of PWE, however, 
does not allow grasping the historical nature of the problem it tries 
to rationalize. Rather, it suggests that disciplining labor is a universal 
problem and that its explanatory causes must be ahistorical categories. 
Historically, however, both the problem and its causes are products 
of the capitalist mode of production.
Power and Competition
A methodological apparatus based on ahistorical categories 
leads inevitably to other ahistorical categories. Power in this concep-
tion exists only as a violation of perfect competition. It coexists with 
competition because, in imperfect DMCs, it is more efficient to have 
two coordinating mechanisms rather than one. But both power and 
competition exist out of history, as abstract forms of interpersonal 
relationships.
PWE does not even try to explain the real processes through 
which authority and coercive mechanisms have developed in capital-
ism and have transformed competition into a coercive force. On the 
contrary, it defines power in such a way that it is incompatible with 
competition. Competition is thus emptied of its coercive nature, and 
the forms of coercion existing in capitalism are removed from it. The 
power-free nature of competition is not a result of the analysis, but a 
definition. If Walras provided an apparent scientific support to the 
myth of competition as a natural and socially beneficial mechanism, 
post-Walrasians willy-nilly support a new myth: the idea that compe-
tition is the reign of freedom, in which there is no room for power 
and coercion.
4 During the socialist calculation debate, Austrian liberals raised two arguments against socialist 
planning: the impossibility to process huge fluxes of information and the lack of incentive 
schemes for workers. After the development of linear programming and the advent of the 
computer, the first argument lost ground (Austrians tried to keep it alive by insisting on the 
tacit nature of knowledge). As concerns the second argument, neoclassical market socialists 
replied to anti-socialists by developing the same principal agent framework used to monitor 
workers in capitalism. Although academically effective, this reply shows that market socialists 
take alienation for granted even in their ideal models. In Palermo, 1998, I criticize both the 
Austrian and the market socialist positions in the debate from a Marxist perspective.
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Here, however, we have another ideological intrusion hidden 
behind apparently purely methodological choices. Methodologically, 
the problem of this conception of power and competition as abstract, 
mutually incompatible, categories implies that this framework cannot 
explain both of them. It must assume one in order to characterize the 
other as its violation. Competition and power are therefore perfectly 
symmetrical in this methodology. Let us thus try to understand why 
post-Walrasians treat them asymmetrically.
Without exceptions, post-Walrasians take power as the phenom-
enon to be explained, and competition as a natural and everlasting 
category, deserving no scientific explanation. “In the beginning there 
were markets” is Williamson’s explicit starting point. Not of course real 
markets, but neoclassical markets, with atomistic agents and perfect 
competition. By contrast, power is seen as an unnatural phenomenon, 
simply because it does not exist in Walras’ world. This is the origin 
of the problem.
The idea that competition is a natural mode of interaction between 
isolated individuals has been severely criticized by Marx. He points 
out that human interests, with a highly developed division of labor, 
are necessarily social interests. Competition, therefore, is not merely 
a mechanism whereby isolated individuals pursue their goals, accord-
ing to their innate preferences, but a mode of coordination of social 
individuals, with convergent and divergent social interests, influenced 
largely by class relations. Its historical development is a consequence 
of the development of property relations, another process that bour-
geois economists assume rather than explain. In Frederick Engels’ 
words (Engels, 1844):
We have seen that in the end everything comes down to competition, so long 
as private property exists . . . because private property isolates everyone in 
his own crude solitariness, and because, nevertheless, everyone has the same 
interest as his neighbour, one landowner stands antagonistically confronted 
by another, one capitalist by another, one worker by another. In this discord 
of identical interests resulting precisely from this identity is consummated 
the immorality of mankind’s condition hitherto; and this consummation is 
competition.
Before explaining power as a violation of perfect competition, post-
Walrasians should explain why they choose precisely competition as 
their starting point. If they do not even raise the question, it is only 
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because the starting point is itself a product of bourgeois ideology: 
in capitalism, competition appears as natural and Walras’ model only 
formalizes this appearance.
3. ONTOLOGY
Before capitalism, in this conception, there was not feudalism, or 
other modes of production, but Léon Walras. The nature of power 
relations is not studied as a transformation of the power relations that 
regulated the modes of production that preceded capitalism. Rather, 
power is explained as a deviation of real capitalism from the abstract 
Walrasian model.
Walrasian methodology presupposes a particular ontology. From 
a Marxist viewpoint, this ontology is problematic, for it is insufficient 
to characterize the capitalist mode of production. The problem is 
twofold: first, it assumes that capitalism coincides with free contract-
ing; second, it conflates the spheres of production and circulation. 
Although PWE does not develop any explicit ontological reasoning, its 
specific methodology based on imperfections imposes new conditions 
on the Walrasian ontology. Let me discuss how the twofold problem 
that I mentioned presents itself in this more sophisticated ontology.
Free Contracting, Interpersonal Power and Social Coercion
According to Walras and PWE, a world of perfect information and 
free contracting is, by definition, a world free from power relations or, 
to use Marx’s provocative expression, “the Eden of the innate rights 
of man.” This is why, theoretically, PWE needs imperfections to deal 
with power-related phenomena. The fact that contracting agents might 
face completely different material constraints when they “freely” sign 
the contract is not seen as a potential cause of their power relation. 
Their different role in production as members of opposing social 
classes plays no role in the explanation of their power relationship. 
On the contrary, the implicit assumption is that contracts are signed 
in a vacuum in which only subjective choice matters.
As Marx has shown, free contracting is only one of the historical 
conditions of the emergence of proper capitalistic relations. But, for 
a capitalist–worker relation to emerge, the laborer must be free in a 
double sense: “That as a free man, he can dispose of his labor-power 
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as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other 
commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realization 
of his labor-power” (Marx, 1867, ch. 6).
Free contracting and the lack of the means of production are 
the two ingredients of capitalistic exploitation. There is no abuse, no 
asymmetric information or bounded rationality, in the power relation 
of the capitalist over the worker. The fact that the latter obeys the for-
mer is not even the essence of the problem in Marx’s ontology. Their 
interpersonal power relation depends on the relation of exploitation 
existing between their social classes. Therefore, the coercive nature of 
capitalism is not sought in the single interpersonal relation between 
a capitalist and a worker in isolation, but in the social mechanisms 
that separate the population into social classes and that reproduce 
this social structure.
In this ontology — built explicitly on the conditions of reproduc-
tion of the capitalist mode of production — the worker is not obliged 
to exchange his/her labor-power with the wage of a particular  capi-
talist, but is obliged to exchange his/her labor-power with the wage 
of a (any) capitalist. Alchian and Demsetz are then right when they 
affirm that the worker is a free individual, who can leave the capitalist 
whenever he/she wants. But this is only one side of the coin. Capital-
ism would not reproduce itself just by means of exchanges between 
grocers and customers. Only in the abstract reign of free contracts, is 
this relation formally equivalent to that between capitalist and worker. 
In real capitalism, the coin has a second side. The worker is still free 
to interrupt the relation with the capitalist, but his/her freedom of 
choice is very peculiar: he/she must  obey a capitalist or choose  another 
capitalist to obey (or more realistically, hope to be chosen by a capitalist). 
And the worst thing that can happen to a worker, in a society based 
on capital, is not to enter into a relation with any capitalist wishing 
to command and exploit him/her.
It is not a problem of uncertainty, bounded rationality or asymmet-
ric information: the worker may know or ignore the fact that, within 
capitalistic firms, he/she must obey the capitalist and give him part 
of the value he/she produces; but, these are the rules of the game 
and if he/she does not accept them, he/she will not get the means of 
subsistence. This is not to say that imperfections are useless catego-
ries. On the contrary, if one introduces them explicitly in this more 
accurate ontology, it is evident that asymmetric information, bounded 
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rationality and other “imperfections” modify the existing power rela-
tions, but do not create them: if a worker is not well-informed or is 
rationally bounded, he/she might accept worse conditions than his/
her colleagues. Yet, even the most rational and well-informed worker 
will never get a job if he/she is not ready to obey and to be exploited.
By contrast, PWE introduces imperfections in a contradictory 
ontology, in which capitalism is reduced to free contracting. In Wal-
ras’ model, this assumption is coupled with the perfect DMC. The 
result is a conception in which, by assumption, the only coordinating 
mechanism is competition. In the ontology of PWE, free contracting is 
analyzed instead within an imperfect DMC. The result is a conception 
in which power relations exist, beside competition, but, by construc-
tion, only as a consequence of imperfections. This suggests a picture 
of a society in which contracts are the highest expression of individual 
freedom and power relations emerge only when their enforcement is 
problematic — the best way to dismiss Marx’s critique, without even 
considering it: in the search of the forms of coercion of this mode 
of production, Marx’s theoretical concern is not that contracts are 
sometimes violated, but that they are generally respected.
Production, Circulation and the Free Trader Vulgaris
In Marx’s characterization of capitalism as a system of commod-
ity production, there is a clear-cut separation between the spheres of 
production and circulation of commodities. This separation allows 
him to discuss how capital may appear to be productive (in circula-
tion), notwithstanding its unproductive nature (in production) and 
to criticize economic conceptions based solely on circulation.
In the sphere of circulation, capitalists and workers do not appear 
in the first instance as social entities, but simply as individuals, who 
exchange commodities. But before being exchanged, commodities 
must be produced. Before discussing the forms of power originat-
ing directly in the sphere of circulation, Marx explains the forms of 
coercion emanating from production:5
5 Within modern Marxism, Fourie (1989) has criticized transaction costs economics, by argu-
ing that its explanations of hierarchy in production rests on a theoretical confusion between 
production and exchange. Before him, Engels (1878, Part II, chapter 1) had noticed: “Pro-
duction may occur without exchange, but exchange — by the very fact that it is only an 
exchange of products — cannot occur without production.”
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On leaving this sphere of simple circulation or of exchange of commodities, 
which furnishes the “Free-trader Vulgaris” with his views and ideas, and with 
the standard by which he judges a society based on capital and wages, we 
think we can perceive a change in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. 
He, who before was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the 
possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of im-
portance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, 
like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect 
but — a hiding. (Marx, 1867, ch. 6.)
Historically, the need to supervise production is a consequence 
of the problematic process of extracting living labor from workers’ 
labor-power. Marx discusses this process in different parts of Capital 
and explains how the internal organization of the firm and the way 
workers are disciplined in the workplace evolve according to the needs 
of capital accumulation. He points out for instance that the develop-
ment of stock companies and cooperative factories are very different 
processes, but are also responses to the same problem: in one case, 
the extraction of living labor from workers’ labor-power is delegated 
to a manager, in the other to workers themselves (Marx, 1894, ch. 27).
Modern Marxists, such as Harry Braverman (1974), Stephen Mar-
glin (1974, 1975), and Richard Edwards (1979) have developed this 
conception by discussing the evolution of class relationships and the 
development of different forms of power, authority and hierarchy 
within capitalist firms in the 20th century. Social exploitation and 
interpersonal power relations, in the work of these authors, are dialec-
tically linked: on the one hand, exploitative class relations in society 
are the cause of the interpersonal power relation in the workplace; 
on the other hand, the evolution of the forms of power prevailing 
within capitalist firms transforms class relations and modifies the rate 
of exploitation.
In this ontology, the forms of power that prevail in the sphere of 
production are linked to the exchanges that must occur in circula-
tion in order for the system to reproduce itself. Capitalist production 
starts with the sale of workers’ labor-power. By buying this commodity, 
the capitalist acquires the right to dispose of it. It is not a question 
of price. The worker might sell it dear or cheap, but the very act of 
selling his/her labor-power gives the capitalist an interpersonal power 
over him/her during the production process.
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PWE, however, does not start from the real development of capi-
talism and its reproducing mechanisms, but from an abstract model, 
based on a flat ontology in which production is, de facto, a subset of 
circulation, an exchange between input owners. The result is a more 
sophisticated ontology, still based on pure circulation, in which how-
ever circulation incorporates imperfections. Even the central relation 
that characterizes production — the capitalist–worker relationship 
— is considered as a form of exchange, an exchange that occurs in a 
complex DMC, but still a phenomenon of circulation.
In this ontology, the price that the capitalist pays to have power 
over the worker is not simply the wage, as Marx argued, but a part of 
it. In PWE, by definition, competitive wages involve no power rela-
tions. The latter arise only when the capitalist pays additional money 
to induce worker’s self-discipline. Power is thus a sort of commodity, 
which the capitalist buys from the worker — besides his/her labor 
power — in order to increase his/her productivity, exactly as he buys 
machines, work instruments and innovative technologies. Like all 
commodities, power has its equilibrium price, defined as the amount 
of money that compensates the worker for not using his/her informa-
tive advantages opportunistically.
As Marx has explained, in the eyes of the capitalist, the value of 
production is produced by the total capital he has invested, indepen-
dent of the real origin of value. By formally including power in the 
reign of commodities, PWE preserves this appearance. If the capitalist 
buys a machine or a power relation, it is only because the increase 
in expected revenues is greater than the cost of the investment. For 
him, power relations are production factors, no less than any other 
work instrument he buys in order to increase workers’ productivity. 
Therefore, the increase in the value of production following the pur-
chase of a power relation over the worker appears to him as an effect 
of the capital spent in this investment, not as a consequence of the 
increase in the worker’s effort (which, in Marxist terms, corresponds 
to an increase in the amount of living labor extracted from his/her 
labor-power).
Without any ontological separation between production and cir-
culation, the appearances that capital is productive and that individu-
als are equal becomes in PWE the true essence of capitalism. In this 
mystified conception, the asymmetry responsible for eventual power 
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relations must be introduced directly in circulation, even when dealing 
with capitalists and workers. Formal equality in the market becomes 
synonymous with “freedom,” and power relations are detected only 
when they manifest themselves formally in asymmetric market rela-
tions. All other forms of coercion within capitalism become invisible.
4. FORMAL SIMILARITIES WITHIN 
OPPOSITE CONCEPTIONS
We have now the elements to discuss how PWE can substantiate the 
Marxist claim that the capitalist has power over the worker.
Marx’s Demystification of the Coercive Nature of Competition
The main theoretical problem faced by Marx in his attempt to 
explain the forms of coercion within capitalism is that capitalism is 
a mystified system. As he shows, one of the specificities of this mode 
of production is that its exploitative nature is hidden behind the 
appearance of free market exchange. His critique of political economy, 
therefore, is not a mere attempt to downsize the role of his theoretical 
and political rivals. It is rather a way to demystify the appearances of 
capitalist reality — which bourgeois economists rationalize — and to 
explain scientifically what at first glance cannot be seen. The complex-
ity of Marx’s analysis stems from this twofold scientific goal: discovering 
the coercive mechanisms of capitalist accumulation, and explaining 
how social coercion and exploitation might appear as expressions of 
individual freedom and equality. Both these problems lead him to 
deepen the role of competition.6
Marx’s discussion of competition starts with its historical origins, 
before the rise of the capitalist mode of production, as a consequence 
of two institutions: private property and the market. Capitalism, how-
ever, is characterized also by the commodification of labor-power, i.e., 
by the extension of private property and the market to labor-power as 
well. This is why, in this mode of production, competition also takes 
on a class dimension. With the development of capitalism, capital 
tends to subsume all human activities and put living labor under 
its command. In this process, competition imposes its logic over an 
6 I have discussed Marx’s view on competition in Palermo, 2015.
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expanding sphere of social relations and tends to become the coor-
dinating principle of the whole society, the “external coercive law” of 
this mode of production, in Marx’s terms.
At an interpersonal level, its coercive nature depends on the pres-
sure it puts on market participants. No worker is obliged to sell his 
labor-power at the lowest price, and no capitalist is obliged to seek 
the most profitable productions and the least expensive techniques. 
But if they do not do it, the former does not get the means of subsis-
tence and the latter is put out of the market. It is only at a social level, 
however, that the coercive nature of competition can be fully grasped, 
as the main economic mechanism that regulates the reproduction 
of class relations. Marx’s study of a world regulated by competition, 
therefore, is not an attempt to see how interpersonal relations would 
be in a system without power and coercion, but a methodological 
choice intended to isolate the role of this coercive mechanism in the 
working and reproduction of capitalism.
In the process of commodification, competition tends to impose its 
logic at a subjective level as well: as the spectrum of social relations gov-
erned by competition develops, competition tends to appear as a natural 
force, a form of interaction that has always existed, a consequence of 
human nature. Only at this stage, does it become possible to conceive of 
a world entirely regulated by market relations and competition. Histori-
cally, however, the appearance of a competitive “human nature” — which 
the bourgeois economist takes has the theoretical starting point of his 
explanations — is in fact a product of capitalist development.
Post-Walrasian Mystification of Power and Competition
Marx’s radical successors within PWE do not develop this concep-
tion and do not even consider Marx’s critique of bourgeois economics. 
Rather, without understanding that the latter applies largely to them 
as well, they uncritically adopt a neoclassical methodology and then 
try to obtain conclusions with a Marxist sound.
The idea is that Marx’s method is weak and fuzzy, and that only 
a strict neoclassical method can overcome its internal limitations. 
The historical rise of neoclassical economics — an academic reac-
tion against Marxism and its revolutionary implications — is taken 
as the birth of the universal economic method, to which even Marx 
should be converted. As a scientist, Marx is worthless. Only some of 
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his non-scientific intuitions might perhaps be saved (for reasons that 
Marx himself did not understand). This is the way in which PWE views 
the founder of scientific socialism. This is the logic of this new “hetero-
dox” academic fashion, which includes Rational Choice Marxism and 
market socialism as well: either Marxism becomes a small chapter of 
neoclassical economics or it remains scientific bullshit (“non-bullshit 
Marxism” is the self-assigned label of Analytical Marxists).
Unfortunately, neoclassical economics cannot be bought à la carte. 
When you buy its method, you buy its implicit ontology and its ideo-
logical premises as well. The result is that the same statement — that 
the capitalist has power over the worker — takes here a completely 
different meaning with respect to Marx’s conception of this relation 
and of its role in class struggle.
Methodologically, the starting point is the Walrasian model, in 
which all economic relations are compressed within the sphere of 
circulation and analyzed according to methodological individual-
ism. With these premises, the only way to demonstrate that economic 
relations might involve power is to play with assumptions. “Imperfec-
tions” and “individuals with heterogeneous innate qualities” are the 
methodological tools of the game chosen by PWE, within an implicit 
ontology based on free contracting and pure circulation.
In playing this game, Bowles, Gintis and their neoclassical col-
leagues have not found anything better than assuming an asymmetry in 
favor of the individual worker against the individual capitalist, before 
the exchange, in order to explain why, after the exchange, the latter 
has power over the former. Their story begins with the advantage of 
the individual worker and finishes with the capitalist having power 
over him/her. But only because, in the middle, there is the mon-
etization of the worker’s advantage. The power relation suffered by 
the worker is thus caused by his/her supposedly favorable position 
with respect to the capitalist, not the other way round. Reality is thus 
turned upside-down, as in the old mystified conception of bourgeois 
economics. Although neoclassical economics does not like the notion 
of exploitation, in PWE, the exploited one might eventually be the 
capitalist, who pays the rent, but surely not the worker who collects it.
But to fully grasp this mystified conception, we must follow the worker 
on the day in which he/she finally gets rid of his/her power relation 
with the capitalist, the day in which the latter introduces a new machine, 
which regulates workers’ effort, their pace of work and their mode of 
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coordination with each other. This same day, the worker loses the informa-
tion advantage, the rent and perhaps the job. For PWE, however, this is 
the day of his/her liberation from the capitalist’s power. Now, finally, the 
worker can leave the capitalist without losing anything (having already 
lost everything, except his/her labor-power). This is freedom in PWE.
To show that the capitalist has power over the worker, PWE assumes 
that the individual worker is not a member of the class of persons who 
have nothing to sell except their labor-power, but, on the contrary, 
that he/she is a privileged person within this class, having also some-
thing else to sell (his/her information advantages). Workers at the 
perfectly competitive (subsistence) wage suffer no power relations in 
this conception. In a complete overturning of Marx’s idea, here the 
interpersonal power relation suffered by the individual worker is not 
caused by his/her membership in an exploited class, but by his/her 
privileged position within this class. In a nutshell, in PWE, the worker 
suffers a power relation not because of his/her social weakness, but 
because of his/her individual strength.
Some post-Walrasians might be satisfied with the formal similari-
ties between their results and Marx’s theory. Their conception of sci-
ence and their role in society, however, resemble closely those of “the 
vulgar economist [who] does practically no more than translate the 
singular concepts of the capitalists . . . into a seemingly more theoreti-
cal and generalized language, and attempt to substantiate the justice 
of those conceptions” (Marx, 1894, ch. 13).
5. THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM
Before moving to conclusions, let me discuss the ideological nature 
of the scientific problem of PWE. As we have seen, PWE assumes self-
interested individuals. Self-interested behavior, however, is described 
as “profit maximization” with regard to the capitalist and as “opportun-
ism,” “shirking” or “cheating” with regard to the worker. The prob-
lem is not only terminological. It reflects rather a precise, although 
implicit, ideological position.
Bourgeois Ideology and Scientific Questions
Contemporary capitalism offers a wide range of examples of con-
tracts that are not enforced correctly: workers that are not paid for 
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months by their employers, banks that do not pay back depositors’ 
money, states that do not honor their international commitments, 
women who are molested in the workplace. These are not distortions 
of capitalism, but normal effects of self-interested behaviors in a society 
characterized by asymmetrical power relations.
With asymmetric power relations, it is clear that the powerful, 
not the powerless, can more easily behave opportunistically. For some 
reason, however, when the capitalist–worker relationship is at stake, 
post-Walrasians are preoccupied mainly by the possibility that the 
worker takes a break, slows down the pace of work or does not maxi-
mize effort during the working day — problems that perhaps should 
concern more the capitalist than the economist. This is the origin of 
the literature on monitoring, shirking, incentive schemes, principal–
agent problems and the rest.
As we have seen, the post-Walrasian framework has been applied 
to very different situations in which contract enforcement is problem-
atic. Curiously, however, no post-Walrasian focuses on the millions 
of workers that suffer daily abuse by their boss but have no means to 
bring him to the tribunal (and perhaps no interest in doing so). Nor 
do they focus on those who just accept the contract because they have 
no alternative, no matter the terms of the contract. By assumption, as 
Bowles and Gintis say explicitly, the employer’s promises are legally 
enforceable and the problem is only on the worker’s side.
Formally, there is no asymmetry between capitalists and workers 
in this theoretical framework. As self-interested individuals, they will 
contravene their commitments every time this increases their expected 
utility. In concrete model building, however, PWE treats these two 
figures asymmetrically: one is the supervisor, the other the supervised, 
one is the principal, the other the agent; and the “scientific problem” 
is to find effective supervising methods and to push the agent to serve 
at best the interests of the principal. Implicitly or explicitly, capitalists’ 
interests are transformed into social goals.
Starting from a symmetrical conflict, post-Walrasians introduce 
an asymmetry and put themselves at the service of one of the conflict-
ing parties. There is no theoretical reason why the economist should 
take the viewpoint of the capitalist, rather than that of the worker. But 
once this theoretical choice has been taken, implicitly or explicitly, 
all issues of “cheating,” “shirking” and “laziness” follow naturally. This 
is why, in this literature, the lazy one is the worker, who works seven 
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hours and 55 minutes (having “shirked” 5 minutes in the toilets), not 
the capitalist who does not work at all.
Neoliberal Cultural Hegemony
Theoretically, there is no obstacle that prevents neoclassical econ-
omists from developing also the social consequences of capitalists’ 
opportunistic strategies against their employees. If this occurs rarely 
it is because the scientific community has its own internal logic. As 
Antonio Gramsci pointed out in his study of cultural hegemony and 
the role of intellectuals, dominant ideology tends to impose the view-
point of the ruling class as a cultural norm (Gramsci, 2007).
PWE is both a cause and an effect in this process. On the one hand, 
its scientific problem is a product of capitalist ideology: the problem 
is to monitor and discipline labor. On the other hand, by transform-
ing the capitalist’s problem (the worker’s opportunism) into a social 
problem, it reinforces the ideas that workers’ discipline is a universal 
goal, and that all studies developing explicitly the standpoint and 
interests of the worker are politically biased and hence, according to 
the dominant conception, not really scientific.
Before Marxists converted to neoclassical methodology (and neo-
liberal ideology) took this route, the scientific defense of capitalists’ 
interests in the workplace was not hidden behind questions of Pareto 
efficiency and second-best solutions. Both Marxists and bourgeois 
economists agreed that a greater effort at work was in the interest of 
capitalists and went against those of the working class.
When in 1911 Frederick Taylor wrote The Principles of Scientific 
Management — in which he studied how to increase workers produc-
tivity and extract as much labor as possible from their labor-power 
— its impact in the political and scientific debate was unambiguous: 
his work was appreciated not only by capitalists — which is quite 
obvious — but also by mainstream economists. Rapidly, scientific 
management affirmed itself as a new research program, with new 
university teachings and specialized academic journals. In the Marx-
ist camp, this managerial approach was openly criticized, both theo-
retically and politically, with the development of the so-called labor 
process debate.
Taylor of course was not a Marxist and was perfectly aware that 
his fortune was due to his ability to put science at the service of the 
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capitalist class. Less evident, by contrast, are the real intentions of radi-
cals, who accept neoclassical economics as a matter of pure methodol-
ogy, without discussing the relations between ideology and methodol-
ogy. The concrete effect of their theories, however, is straightforward: 
in a historical context, in which the labor movement was trying to 
unite and organize in the workplace and in the overall society, post-
Walrasians have contributed to rationalize the everlasting problem 
of the capitalist class — to discipline labor and organize it according 
to capitalists’ needs — and to reinforce a conception in which power 
is only an interpersonal affair.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In his contribution for the Journal of Economic Perspectives, referred to 
at the beginning of this paper, Joseph Stiglitz (1993) discusses explic-
itly the relations between the radical approach of Bowles and Gintis 
and the mainstream development of Walrasian economics, based on 
imperfect information and costly contract enforcement. He argues 
that there are striking parallels between the two approaches, that 
they use the same method and set of assumptions and that they deal 
basically with the same problem. The difference, in his view, is only 
about terminology:
Mainstream economists have not only found concepts like exploitation and 
power to be useless in explaining economic phenomena, but they worry about 
introducing such emotionally charged words into the analysis. But that is 
presumably precisely why the radical economists choose to use such words: 
they want the analysis to motivate action. (Stiglitz, 1993, 112.)
It is not very surprising that the winner of the Nobel Prize considers 
exploitation and power as emotionally charged words, rather than 
scientific concepts, and that, by contrast, he considers efficiency — 
the key word of the neoliberal political program — as a value-free 
notion.7 But this is only a confirmation that value judgments are eas-
ily detectable only when they break the beliefs that form the cultural 
hegemony of a given time. Otherwise they may appear as neutral, 
7 Rigorously speaking, Stiglitz’s efficiency wages theory has more to do with exploitation than 
with efficiency, for total output is not increased by holding inputs constant, but by increasing 
one of them: the amount of labor extracted from workers’ labor-power.
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even though the very possibility of pure objectivity in social research 
is a highly controversial issue.8
Apart from this consideration, I share fully Stiglitz’s conclusion 
about the internal compatibility of this research program. This is, 
however, only half of the story. The second half regards the relation 
with Marx. In this paper, I have thus explicitly espoused a Marxist 
perspective and I have submitted to critique the methodology, ontol-
ogy and ideology of PWE.
Let me recap my conclusions by starting from the pre-scientific 
choices of PWE. In the analysis of the capitalist–worker relationship, 
post-Walrasians — from ultra-liberals to radicals — have unanimously 
focused on the capitalist’s standpoint and have thus helped to rational-
ize and solve his economic problem. In this way — perhaps, in some 
cases, involuntarily — they have transformed a problem of a part of 
society into a problem of the entire society. This choice involves a 
stronger role for ideology than is the case for Walrasian economics. 
The latter is only an attempt to formalize the virtues of market inter-
actions among atomized individuals. PWE goes further. Within the 
same individualist framework, which assigns no role to class relations, 
it introduces social classes surreptitiously by defining “the economic 
problem” as “the problem of the capitalist.” This ideological degenera-
tion of radical thinking — I suggest — is the outcome of two interde-
pendent processes: 1) the tendency to uncritically accept neoclassical 
methodology in the scientific community; 2) the consolidation of the 
neoliberal hegemony in culture and society.
Post-Walrasian methodology is based on two main ingredients: 
imperfections and opportunism. These ingredients are defined ahis-
torically. The resulting conception of power is ahistorical as well. The 
different forms that power takes in the history of capitalism are not 
objects of scientific inquiry. The goal is rather to show that there is a 
valid alternative to competition, under certain conditions. The result 
is a theory of power in which, by construction, competition is power-
free. In PWE, the coercive law of capitalism is not competition, as 
Marx thought, but the lack of it.
8 The role of value judgments in the use of Pareto efficiency is critically discussed by Hausman 
and McPherson, 1996. For a broader discussion of the ideological content of economics 
and of the problem of objectivity in social science, Dobb, 1973 and Myrdal, 1969 remain 
two classical references.
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This methodology imposes new conditions on the implicit ontol-
ogy of Walras’ model. In PWE, capitalists and workers are not social 
entities, but individuals with innate qualities. Their eventual power 
relation depends only on these qualities and on their fit with an imper-
fect DMC. The fact that one is a capitalist and the other a worker 
is irrelevant. They might also be a bank and a firm, two states, or 
a customer and a grocer. As long as the parameters of the models 
coincide, the nature of the power relation is the same. And as power 
arises in circulation, where only exchanges of equivalents occur, the 
interpersonal asymmetry before the exchange must be assumed to be 
favorable to the worker if one wants to prove that, after the exchange 
— when individual advantages have been monetized — power is in 
the hands of the capitalist.
When we move from the formal claim that “PWE has demon-
strated that the capitalist has power over the worker” to a discussion 
of the causes and the mechanisms of this power relation, the result 
is not so Marxist. Rather, it is a logical development of the mystified 
conception formalized by Walras. The proof is that, in these models, 
power is a form of capital and, as such, is treated as productive. But 
this also confirms that PWE is only a sophisticated version of the old 
bourgeois conception criticized by Marx, in which all forms of capital 
are conceptualized as productive. My conclusion is that, overall, PWE 
is a coherent extension of perfect exchange to contested exchange. 
The obvious consequence, however, is the addition of new contradic-
tions to an already contradictory conception.
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